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Abstract 
 
The aim of this paper is to investigate whether Islamic banks have greater market power than 
conventional banks. Indeed Islamic banks may benefit from a captive clientele,  owing to 
religious principles, which would be charged greater prices. To measure market power, we 
compute Lerner indices on a sample of banks from 17  countries in which Islamic and 
conventional banks coexist over the period 2000-2007. Comparison of Lerner indices shows 
no  significant difference between Islamic banks and conventional banks. When including 
control variables, regression of Lerner indices even suggests that Islamic banks have a lower 
market power than conventional banks. A robustness check with the Rosse-Panzar model 
confirms that Islamic banks are not less competitive than conventional banks. The  lower 
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I. Introduction 
There is a wide expansion of Islamic banks in the recent decades. Since the creation of 
the first modern Islamic bank in 1975, the number of these institutions has increased to over 
300 operating in more than 75 countries. Total assets of Islamic banks worldwide are 
estimated at about 300 billion USD with an annual growth rate of more than 15% over the last 
decade (Chong and Liu, 2009).
2
In this area, a key question concerns the market power of Islamic banks. Market power 
is the ability of a firm to influence the price of products and is therefore directly linked to 
competition, as greater competition reduces market power. Islamic banks may have a greater 
market power than conventional banks. Indeed they can benefit from a clientele with a more 
inelastic demand, coming from religious principles. Most countries with Islamic banks have 
the ongoing presence of few Islamic banks with conventional banks. Therefore, religious 
clients may be more captive to Islamic banks following their will to respect the Shariah, than 
non-religious clients to all categories of banks. El Gamal (2007) mentions that some providers 
and observers of the Islamic banking industry refer to these additional charges and rates for 
clients of Islamic banks as “the cost of being Muslim”, and stresses the possibility of such 
overpricing.
 
Despite this considerable development, the academic literature - though increasing -
remains scarce on the economic implications  of Islamic banking  in comparison with 
conventional banking. Indeed it is of utmost interest to know whether Islamic banks may 
differ than conventional banks for economic issues,  and may therefore  foster or hamper 
economic development in comparison to conventional banks.  
3
The comparative analysis of market power between Islamic and conventional banks is a 
fundamental issue for economic development, as several studies have shown the importance 
of market power for economic development (Petersen and Rajan, 1995; Jayaratne and 
Strahan, 1996; Cetorelli and Gambera, 2001). In a nutshell, the argument is that greater bank 
competition enhances access to credit at lower cost that leads to more borrowing for firms, 
which promotes growth.  More generally, an enhancement of bank competition can favor 
financial development by increasing access to financial products and, as literature has shown 
 Kuran (2004) supports this view by observing that Turkish banks managed to 
attract quickly one percent of total deposits in a few months, in spite of a small number of 
branches. 
                                                  
2 For a complete reference on Islamic banking, see Iqbal and Mirakhor (2007). 
3 In an interview, El-Gamal indeed argues that he worries about the possibility that “some sectors of the Muslim 
American population might be willing to pay $500 more to buy peace of mind”.   
(http://www.universityislamicfinancial.com/file/News/Voiceof%20AmericaArticle%2004.09.2007l.pdf)   4 
a positive link between financial development and economic development (Levine, 2005), 
then contributes to foster economic development. 
The aim of this research is therefore to measure and compare the market power of 
Islamic banks and conventional banks. To do so, we compute Lerner indices on a wide cross-
country sample of banks from 17 MENA and Southeastern Asian countries, in which Islamic 
banks and conventional banks coexist, over the period 2000-2007. The Lerner index equals 
the price minus the marginal cost, divided by the price. It has been widely used in recent 
studies focusing on market power in banking (Fernandez de Guevara, Maudos and Perez, 
2005; Fernandez de Guevara and Maudos, 2007; Solis and Maudos, 2008). 
To our knowledge, no empirical work has ever investigated this issue. Nevertheless, a 
couple of papers can be loosely  related  to our work, as they also provide  elements of 
comparison between Islamic and conventional banks through empirical works at the bank 
level. In their analysis of efficiency of Turkish banks for the period 1990-2000, El-Gamal and 
Inanoglu (2005) notably compare efficiency between banks from different types, including a 
few Islamic banks (the so-called “special finance houses”). They find no significant difference 
in efficiency between Islamic banks  and other banks. Cihak and Hesse (2008) perform a 
comparative analysis of Islamic and conventional banks in terms of financial stability. They 
compare the Z-score, which is an inverse measure of the bank’s probability of failure, for a 
sample of banks from 18 countries. They find that small Islamic banks are financially stronger 
than small conventional banks, but large conventional banks are financially stronger than 
large Islamic banks. Finally, Olson and Zoubi (2008) compare the accounting ratios of Islamic 
and conventional banks for the Gulf Cooperation Council countries. They notably conclude in 
favor of a greater profitability for Islamic banks.    
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Methodology is reported in section 2. 
Section 3 describes the data. The empirical results are shown in Section 4. We finally provide 





Empirical research on the measurement of bank competition provides several tools, 
which can be divided into the traditional Industrial Organization (IO) and the new empirical 
IO approaches. The traditional IO approach proposes tests of market structure to assess bank 
competition based on the Structure Conduct Performance (SCP) model. The SCP hypothesis   5 
argues that greater concentration causes less competitive bank conduct and leads to greater 
profitability of the bank. According to this, competition can be measured by concentration 
indices such as the market share of the largest banks, or by the Herfindahl index. These tools 
were widely applied until the 1990s. 
The new empirical IO approach provides non-structural tests to circumvent the problems 
of the measures of competition provided by the traditional IO approach. These latter measures 
suffer from the fact that they infer the degree of competition from indirect proxies such as 
market structure or market shares. In comparison, non-structural measures do not infer the 
competitive conduct of banks through the analysis of market structure, but rather measure 
banks’ conduct directly. The measures from the new empirical IO include the Rosse-Panzar 
model, which provide an aggregate measure of competition, and the Lerner index, an 
individual measure of market power. 
In our work, we compute the Lerner index as we want to measure market power of each 
bank of our sample. The Lerner index has been computed in several recent studies on bank 
competition (e.g. Maudos and Fernandez de Guevara, 2004, 2007; Carbo et al., 2009). It is 
defined as the difference between the price and the marginal cost, divided by the price. 
The price is computed by estimating the average price of bank production (proxied by 
total assets) as the ratio of total revenues to total assets, following Fernandez de Guevara, 
Maudos and Perez (2005) and Carbo et al. (2009) among others. The marginal cost is 
estimated on the basis of a translog cost function with one output (total assets) and three input 
prices (price of labor, price of physical capital, and price of borrowed funds). One  cost 
function is estimated for each year to allow technology to change over time. Symmetry and 
linear homogeneity restrictions in input prices are imposed. The cost function is specified as 
follows: 
( ) ε γ β β α α α + + + + + + = ∑ ∑∑ ∑
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where TC denotes total costs, y total assets, w1 the price of labor (the ratio of personnel 
expenses to total assets)
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4 As the Bankscope database does not provide information on the number of employees, we use this proxy 
variable for the price of labor following Maudos and Fernandez de Guevara (2004, 2007). 
, w2 the price of physical capital (the ratio of other non-interest 
expenses to fixed assets), w3 the price of borrowed funds (the ratio of interest expenses to all 
funding). Total costs are the sum of personnel expenses, other non-interest expenses and 
interest expenses. The indices for each bank have been dropped from the presentation for the   6 
sake of simplicity. The estimated coefficients of the cost function are then used to compute 
the marginal cost (MC) as follows: 
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Once  marginal cost has been estimated and price of output computed it is able to 





The sample used in this study includes the commercial, cooperative and savings banks 
of  17  countries (Bahrain, Bangladesh, Brunei, Indonesia, Iran,  Jordan, Kuwait, Malaysia, 
Mauritania, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, Yemen), in 
which Islamic banks and conventional banks coexist, over the period 2000-2007. 
We use the Bankscope database to collect data from financial statements of the banks, 
in line with former cross-country studies including Islamic banks (Al-Muharrami, Matthews 
and Khabari, 2006; Viverita, Brown and Skully, 2007; Cihak and Hesse, 2008).  We use 
unconsolidated accounting data of banks. 
We adopt the Tukey box-plot, based on the use of interquartile range to clean data: 
banks with observations out of the range defined by the first and third quartiles that are 
greater or less than twice the interquartile range were dropped for each input price. We also 
perform some truncations for the Lerner indices. All outliers were dropped. These criteria 
produce a sample of 1301 observations for 264 banks, with 135 observations for 34 Islamic 
banks and 1166 observations for 230 conventional banks. The sample is described by country 
and by type of banks in table 1. 
Table 2 displays summary statistics for the variables adopted in the estimations. A 
striking observation is the similarities of both types of banks. No significant difference in 
bank size can be observed. The mean Islamic bank has 3.27 million USD of total assets to be 
compared to 3.78 million USD for the mean conventional bank. We also observe very similar 
mean input prices for labor and physical capital. The only difference concerns the price of 
borrowed funds which is greater for conventional banks (4.93% vs. 3.50% for Islamic banks). 
This dissimilarity can be relied to the observation of a greater equity to assets ratio for Islamic 
banks (14.72% vs. 10.95% for conventional banks). Indeed, as Islamic banks rely more on   7 
equity, they may have lower charges on borrowed funds. Finally, we observe a major 
difference for activities with the analysis of the ratio of loans to investment assets, which is by 
far greater for conventional banks. This is in line with the different activities practiced by 
Islamic banks and conventional banks. Both these latter points suggest including the ratios of 
equity to assets and of loans to investment assets in the estimations explaining market power, 





This section presents our results for the differences in market power between Islamic 
and conventional banks. We start with the Lerner indices for each type of bank. Next, we 
perform regressions of the Lerner index on a set of variables to take control variables into 
account. Finally, we perform a robustness check with an alternative measure of competition. 
 
IV.1 The market power measures 
We present the means of Lerner indices in table 3 for each type of bank and for each 
year. The average Lerner index for the period is 23.71% with yearly means ranging from 
18.80% to  27.13%.  These figures are comparable to what is found in other studies. For 
instance, Fernandez de Guevara and Maudos (2007) find yearly mean Lerner indices between 
16.9% and 24.9% for Spanish banks, while Carbo and al. (2009) observe mean Lerner indices 
at the country level ranging from 11% to 22% for EU countries with a EU mean of 16%. In 
dynamic terms, the evolution of the Lerner index shows a strong increase between 2000 and 
2005, followed by a reduction in market power between 2005 and 2007. 
However the key issue concerns the comparison of market power between Islamic and 
conventional banks. The mean Lerner indices over the period are respectively 24.37% and 
23.64% for Islamic and conventional banks. But this difference in favor of Islamic banks is 
not  systematic, as the analysis year-by-year  shows that Islamic banks outperform 
conventional banks only for 4 years of our analysis while the opposite is observed for the 4 
other years. Nonetheless  the main finding is that the difference in market power is not 
significant either for each year considered separately or for the full period. 
Thus, our major conclusion is the absence of significant difference in market power 
between Islamic banks and conventional banks. We do not support the arguments according 
to which Islamic banks would have greater market power.   8 
However this analysis has not considered the possible role of other characteristics of 
banks that differ between both types of banks. Furthermore, the fact that banks come from 
different countries should be taken into account. We therefore perform a regression of Lerner 
indices on a set of variables including the type of bank and several control variables. 
 
IV.2 Regression 
We perform a random effects GLS regression of the Lerner indices. This specification is 
motivated by the use of panel data, and the fact that the key explanatory variable, the fact that 
a bank is Islamic or not, is constant over time. The set of explanatory variables includes a 
dummy variable equal to one whether the bank is Islamic and zero else (Islam). We include 
three control variables in the regression: the ratio of loans to investment assets (Loans to 
Investment Assets) to take the mix of assets into account, the ratio of equity to total assets 
(Equity to Total Assets) to control for risk aversion, and size measured by the logarithm of 
total assets (Bank Size). We also include dummy variables for countries and years in the 
regression. 
We now turn to the analysis of control variables. We observe a significantly positive 
sign for the size of the bank, which is in line with the fact that greater banks benefit from 
stronger market power. The ratio of loans to investment assets is not significant, meaning that 
the structure of assets between loans and investment assets does not exert an impact on market 
power. Finally, the ratio of equity to assets is significantly positive, according to which banks 
with greater solvency benefit from market power. This finding may be explained by the fact 
that better solvency allows the banks to charge greater prices to their services. Several papers 
have indeed shown the existence of market discipline among depositors, in particular in 
developing or transition countries in which the risk of bank failure is considered as important 
(e.g.  Karas, Pyle  and  Schoors, 2009). This discipline means that depositors adapt their 
deposits to their perception of the probability of bank failure. Consequently, better solvency 
favors confidence of depositors in the bank’s financial situation which can accept to pay more 
for this safety. 
Therefore, our main finding is that Islamic banks do not have a greater market power 
than conventional banks. Our results from the regression even tend to show that Islamic banks 
have a lower market power. 
Thus, we do not support the view that  Islamic banks may benefit from a captive 
clientele owing to religious principles, which would be charged greater prices. How to explain   9 
the lower market power of Islamic banks? Several explanations can be advanced which focus 
either on the different religious or economic incentives of Islamic banks. 
A first explanation may be the different objectives of Islamic banks in line with the 
distinguished values promoted in Islamic economics. Islamic finance is a part of a more 
global paradigm, Islamic economics, which can be defined as the economics in line with the 
principles of the Qur’an and the Sunna. While Islamic finance is the most well-known feature 
of Islamic economics, this discipline also includes other features as notably the promotion of 
Islamic norms of economic behavior. 
Therefore, according to Hasan (2004), Islamic banks have different objectives than 
conventional banks in line with Islamic economics. Profit is also an objective for Islamic 
banks, as it is a survival requirement. Nevertheless these banks have other priorities, as Islam 
aims at establishing a distinct social order. The prohibition of interest is indeed not in itself 
the objective of Islamic banks, but rather an intermediary target through which Islamic banks 
contribute to establish a world in line with Islamic economics principles. A fundamental value 
to favor is the promotion of mutual help and cooperation. As a consequence, Kuran (2004) 
explains that a producer or a trader is free to seek personal profit, but he must avoid harming 
others. Therefore, he must charge fair prices to his customers. Thus, Islamic banks have the 
obligation to charge fair prices, which may limit their ability to charge the maximal price 
permitted by their degree of market power. 
A big debate however exists in the literature about the practice of these specific norms 
in Islamic banks. Kuran (1995) observes similar returns on savings deposits for Islamic and 
conventional banks in Turkey, while El-Gamal (2007) provides examples of an Islamic bank 
explicitly mentioning that its loan rates are similar to those of conventional banks. 
Some explanations can also be suggested which are based on the economic incentives 
for an Islamic bank to charge lower prices than other banks. Islamic banks may have greater 
incentives  to avoid moral hazard behavior  of borrowers, which gives them incentives to 
charge lower loan rates than conventional banks. The reasoning is based on the argument 
from Boyd and De Nicolo (2005). They pointed out the fact that lower loan rates make easier 
the repayment of loans, and consequently reduced the moral hazard behavior of borrowers to 
shift into riskier projects, which leads to lower default risk of borrowers. As a consequence, 
the more the bank suffers from moral hazard behavior of borrowers, the more the bank is 
inclined to charge lower rates. As Islamic banks follow the profit and loss sharing paradigm in 
opposition to conventional banks which charge fixed repayments, Islamic banks are more   10 
affected by moral hazard behavior as their return is riskier. They consequently have more 
incentives to avoid moral hazard behavior and then to charge lower rates. 
Furthermore, we can also point out the fact than, on the deposit side, the depositors of 
Islamic banks are similar to shareholders as they do not have a fixed interest rate and share 
profits and losses of the bank. Consequently, greater profits from depositor services also mean 
higher prices charged for depositors for them. Thus, they may have incentives to refrain prices 
of financial services for depositors. 
Finally, a last argument can also be advanced which is not guided by specific features of 
Islamic banking. As Islamic banking is a relatively recent industry, Islamic banks may be 
younger than conventional banks. However literature has shown the existence of switching 
costs in the banking industry. These costs notably derive from the time and effort to close an 
account or to become comfortable with a new bank (Kim, Kliger and Vale, 2003), or can also 
endogenously result from the better information of the bank on their clients than competitors 
(Sharpe, 1990; Rajan, 1992). As a consequence, as their establishment is more recent on 
average, Islamic banks may have a clientele less captive, which prevents them to have a 
similar market power than other banks. 
 
IV.3 A robustness check 
To further address the validity of the results, we use an alternative measure for bank 
competition in our estimations. We therefore estimate the Rosse-Panzar model (Rosse and 
Panzar, 1977), which has been widely applied in banking (e.g. Claessens and Laeven, 2004, 
for 50 countries; Al-Muharrami, Matthews and Khabari, 2006, for the six member countries 
of the Gulf Cooperation Council). It is a non-structural test, meaning that it takes into account 
the actual behavior of banks without using information on the structure of the banking market. 
The H-statistic aggregates the elasticities of total revenues to the input prices. It determines 
the nature of market structure: it is equal to 0 in monopoly, between 0 and 1 in monopolistic 
competition, and 1 in perfect competition. 
Several recent studies aiming to explain banking competition have used the H-statistic 
as a measure of competition in regressions (Bikker and Haaf, 2002; Claessens and Laeven, 
2004). We follow their approach by considering the H-statistic as a measure of competition, 
and aims to check the difference in the H-statistic between both types of banks. 
Our aim is to have a measure of competition for each type of banks and each year. We 
therefore run the Rosse-Panzar model for year to obtain estimates of input prices which are 
specific to each year. Furthermore, as we need to have estimates of the coefficients of input   11 
prices specific to each type of banks, we include interactive terms for each input price, 
jointing the variable with a dummy variable for each type of bank. Consequently, we estimate 
the following equation for each year : 
 
ln REVENUES   =  α0 + [ α1 (ln w1) + α2 (ln w2)+ α3 (ln w3)] ISLAM   
+ [ α4 (ln w1) + α5 (ln w2)+ α6 (ln w3)] CONVENTIONAL  
+ α7  ln ASSETS  + α8  ln EQUITY TO ASSETS 
+COUNTRY DUMMIES 
 
where  REVENUES  total revenues, w1,  w2  and  w3  prices of labor, physical capital, and 
borrowed funds respectively which are defined below, ASSETS total assets, EQASS the ratio 
of equity to total assets, k country, ISLAM dummy variable equal to one whether the bank is 
Islamic, CONVENTIONAL dummy variable equal to one whether the bank is conventional. 
The variables ASSETS and EQUITY TO ASSETS take into account differences in size and risk 
respectively, akin to Bikker and Haaf (2002). Indices for each bank have been dropped in the 
presentation for simplicity. Therefore the H-statistic is equal to α1 + α2 + α3 for Islamic 
banks and to α4 + α5 + α6 for conventional banks. 
The results of the Rosse-Panzar model are shown in table 5. We observe values between 
0.3512 and 0.6233 for all types of banks and all years, meaning a monopolistic competition 
structure. This result is in accordance with most former studies estimating the Rosse-Panzar 
model (e.g. Bikker and Haaf, 2002). Al-Muharrami, Matthews and Khabari (2006) found a H-
statistic for the six countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates) for 0.47 with country fixed effects and for 0.24 in a 
pooled model for the period 1993-2002. As a consequence, while our results are in line with 
the conclusion of monopolistic competition of this paper, we observe a greater competition 
level, which may result from the different sample of countries and also from a more recent 
period, suggesting an increase of competition. 
However the key result is the fact that the H-statistic is greater for Islamic banks than 
for conventional banks for all years. This difference is only significant in 2005 and 2007. 
Therefore, the estimations of the Rosse-Panzar model tend to corroborate our main finding 
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V. Concluding remarks 
 
In this paper, we compare the market power of Islamic and conventional banks by 
computing Lerner indices for a large sample of banks from countries in which both types of 
banks coexist. Our hypothesis is that market power is greater for Islamic banks, in line with 
the view that these institutions benefit from clients with a more inelastic demand. This issue is 
of fundamental interest to understand the normative implications of the expansion of Iskamic 
banks. It has indeed been shown that lower bank competition may be detrimental to growth. 
Our findings clearly reject this hypothesis.  The comparison of Lerner indices shows not 
significant difference in market power between Islamic and conventional banks. Furthermore, 
the regression of market power indices even suggests a lower market power for Islamic banks. 
We explain the lower market power of Islamic banks by their different religious and 
economic incentives. Indeed Islamic banks are supposed to respect some “Islamic” norms of 
behavior, such as the obligation to charge fair prices. This might consequently limit their 
ability to charge high prices. Furthermore, Islamic banks have incentives to charge lower loan 
rates than conventional banks, as they suffer more from the moral hazard  behavior  of 
borrowers which can be favored through high rates. 
Thus, our conclusions do not provide support on some detrimental effects of the 
expansion of Islamic banks in terms of market power. Nevertheless the results of this study 
should be considered with care. Indeed this is the first contribution on this issue. Further work 
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Table 1 
Overview of the sample 
 
 
This table gives the number of observations for each type of banks and for each country. 
 
 
Country  All banks  Conventional banks  Islamic banks 
Bahrain  38  24  14 
Bangladesh  222  218  4 
Brunei  16  10  6 
Indonesia  249  244  5 
Iran  39  26  13 
Jordan  45  30  15 
Kuwait  39  32  7 
Malaysia  170  158  12 
Mauritania  26  19  7 
Pakistan  158  148  10 
Qatar  31  23  8 
Saudi Arabia  28  24  4 
Sudan  37  34  3 
Tunisia  107  100  7 
Turkey  38  32  6 
United Arab Emirates  46  42  4 
Yemen  12  2  10 
All  1301  1166  135 
 
 





This table displays the means for variables used in subsequent estimations for each type of banks. Standard 
deviations are reported in brackets. 
 
 
  All banks  Conventional banks  Islamic banks 

























































This table presents the Lerner index for each year and for each type of banks. Lerner indices are presented in 
percentage. Standard deviations are displayed in brackets. 
 
 




Difference  p-value 






-1.51  0.73 






-0.14  0.97 






0.36  0.93 






5.36  0.20 






5.43  0.17 






-3.28  0.43 






-5.43  0.12 






-1.79  0.63 






-0.74  0.61 
 





Random effects GLS regression. The dependent variable is the Lerner index. *, **, *** denote an estimate 
significantly different from 0 at the 10%, 5% or 1% level. Dummy variables for countries and for years are 




Explanatory variables  Coefficient  Standard error 
Intercept 
 
-11.342  7.511 
Islamic Dummy 
 
-4.504*  2.547 
Bank Size 
 
2.515***  0.414 
Loans to Investment Assets 
 
0.002  0.006 
Equity to Assets 
 
71.133***  5.752 
R²  0.3333   
Number of banks  264   
Number of observations  1301   
 
   19 
Table 5 




This table displays the H-statistic estimated by the Rosse-Panzar model for each year and each type of banks. We 
compute the Wald test (F-statistic) to test whether the H-statistic is significantly different for Islamic and for 




  Conventional banks  Islamic banks  Wald test (F statistic) 
2000 
 
0.5145  0.5991  0.91 
2001 
 
0.5473  0.6233  1.08 
2002 
 
0.4755  0.5526  0.80 
2003 
 
0.4003  0.4431  0.26 
2004 
 
0.3512  0.4084  1.08 
2005 
 
0.3573  0.4629  3.95** 
2006 
 
0.5271  0.5320  0.01 
2007 
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